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ABSTRACT
How do European Union (EU) member states communicate risks to their citizens? In this study, we
define risk communication as the information provided by different levels of government to citizens
regarding possible future crises to which the general public might be subjected. We seek to answer
the following questions: Are there any patterns in the risk communication strategies among EU
member states in terms of the sender of information, the message conveyed, the method used,
and the intended audience? Finally, to what extent is the state involved in ensuring the safety of
its citizens? To tackle these questions, we examine the risk communication strategy of eight countries: Sweden, Finland, Germany, England, France, Estonia, Greece, and Cyprus. Our data consist of
governmental web sites, publications, campaigns, and other modes of communication, such as
videos posted on YouTube, with questions centering on institutional actors, methods of delivery,
content, and effectiveness. We find that the institutional architecture of risk communication aligns
with the broad administrative system of each member state. Countries tend to focus on risks that
are specific to their context, with Sweden and, to a lesser extent, Germany having a special focus
on consequences and providing guidelines to the public on how to survive for a certain period
of time in the absence of the state. Especially in Sweden, though the state is a salient actor in risk
communication through the dissemination of information at the agency level, the state retreats
while urging the resilient citizen to take control of his or her own crisis management.
KEYWORDS: Risk communication; comparative studies; European politics; resilience; public
policy

In May 2018, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) sent a
pamphlet to all 4.7 million Swedish households containing information
on how to deal with the consequences of contemporary emergencies,
titled If Crisis or War Comes. This brochure was an updated version
of a series of information sheets from World War II and the Cold War
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era (Dwyer, 2018) and began with a message stating that even though
Sweden was safer than many other countries, it faced threats that
might jeopardize its security and independence (Myndigheten för
samhällsskydd och beredskap, 2018).
Recent events with national repercussions for Sweden include the
looming Russian geopolitical threat, the terrorist attack in central
Stockholm in April 2017, the forest fires in Västmanland of 2014 (see
Öhman, Giritli Nygren, & Olofsson, 2016), and the extensive forest
fires in summer 2018. The cultural imagination of realized disasters
and many other chimerical ones influences the response to current
challenges. The “emergency imaginary” dictates the perception of disasters among professionals (Gregersen & Winkel Holm, n.d.), and in
turn, this perception determines what risks professionals communicate
to the public and how they do so. More specifically, Calhoun (2008)
theorized that framing events as emergencies shapes the way in which
we understand aberrant (perhaps) events, such as inter alia crises,
disasters, and international conflicts, and delineates the range of acceptable actions. The emergency imaginary is a way of conceptualizing
problematic events, foregrounding their “unpredictability, abnormality,
and brevity” while concomitantly pointing to their attendant corollary:
intervention (Calhoun, 2008, p. 375). Calhoun treated the issue of international emergencies and humanitarian intervention, but theoretically,
we can scale down and consider problematic events at the micro level
and what intervention at the individual level might look like.
Calhoun (2008) also noted that attention must be paid to the ways
risks and threats are conceptualized so that we may understand “the
social organization of fear” (p. 381), on one hand, and, on the other,
how the sense of vulnerability is distributed. This is not a new concept
in risk communication research, and in this study, we consider risk
communication specifically at the preparedness phase, which
is designed to understand and address the public’s awareness and
knowledge gaps related to risk events, to elicit desired preparedness
behaviors through identifying and utilizing effective communication
channels, to ensure adequate understanding, and to educate about what
actions to take when messages are issued. (Sheppard, Janoske, & Liu,
2012, p. 11; see also Leiss, 1996; Lofstedt, 2010)
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The empirical impetus for this research was the striking catholic and
centralized nature of the aforementioned communiqué issued by the
Swedish state. Our study aims at filling the apparent lacuna of crosscountry European comparisons when it comes to risk communication
at the preparedness phase (see, however, Infanti et al., 2013; Lofstedt,
2010; Tourenq, Boustras, & Gutteling, 2017 for a set of guidelines). From
a theoretical perspective, we seek to uncover the architecture (actors,
institutions, and the degree of their involvement, message, method,
and audience) as part of the risk communication process. In other
words, our research question is as follows: How is this imaginary of
emergencies in Europe reflected in the content of risk communication
messages issued by governmental organizations?
To answer this question, we conducted a comparative study of eight
European Union (EU) member states with the objective to map the
institutional risk communication structure, the messages that these
actors send, how these messages are conveyed, and to whom.
Literature Review

Risk communication as a research area is broad and diversified, including areas such as risk perception, risk and emotions, social construction of risk, media communication, framing, social movements, public
engagement, and, not least, crisis communication (Cho, Reimer, & McComas, 2006; Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2011). Therefore, whenever we
study “risk communication,” we need to define our object of inquiry and
thus delimit our investigation. In this article, we investigated national
and subnational risk communication and more specifically the way
different European countries have designed their risk communication
architecture regarding possible future crises where the receiver is the
public at large.
Empirically and theoretically focused research has targeted the
receivers’ information seeking (Alaszewski, 2005), perception of risk
communication tools and messages (Slovic, 1999), trust in communicators (Renn & Levine, 1991), vulnerabilities (Fothergill, Maestas,
& Darlington, 1999), and sociocultural contexts (Wardman, 2014).
Although such research has produced insight and guidelines regarding
these different core aspects of risk communication, relatively few studies
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have focused on public policy, particularly in a comparative perspective.
Two exceptions are the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) report Trends in Risk Communication Policies and
Practices from 2016, which reviewed the risk communication systems
of 19 countries, and the 2017 study authored by Tourenq, Boustras, and
Gutteling that compared the policy design of Cyprus, France, and the
Netherlands (see also Infanti et al.’s 2013 literature review on effective
risk communication in Europe). Reflecting the risk communication
literature, the OECD (2016) defined six criteria for effective risk communication:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Consistency across different risk communication tools.
Two-way communication and interactive approaches.
Accuracy and trust. Best available knowledge should be used
in a transparent way.
Accessibility of information for citizens, NGOs (non-governmental organizations) and private organizations to seek and use.
Information adapted to the audience’s cognitive capacities, their
exposure or vulnerability.
Cross-sectoral and trans-boundary, reflecting the cross-border,
multiple dimensions and possible cascading effects of threats
and hazards. (p. 30)

The report illustrates how risk communication systems may be understood and evaluated based on these criteria and the state of the art
(e.g., Hampel, 2006; Leiss, 1996; Renn & Levine, 1991; Ulmer et al.,
2011). See Table 1.
The conclusions of the report partly indicate that national risk communication needs to be more inclusive and interactive and to focus more
on prevention, that is, provide more information about what people can
do to mitigate their exposure to risk. Tourenq, Boustras, and Gutteling
(2017) argued similarly in a comparative study of Cyprus, France, and
the Netherlands. They evaluated available information on the countries’ websites based on the assumption that two-way communication
enhances individual preparedness and resilience. They found that both
France and the Netherlands had interactive communication and that

If Crisis or War Comes
TABLE 1

211

Core Elements of a National Risk Communication System
Element

Description

Governance

Who is in charge of risk communication, and what is the
institutional structure of risk communication governance?

Considering all hazards and
forward thinking

How comprehensive and forward oriented are national risk
communication practices?

Purpose of communication
and activation of target
audience

What is the purpose of countries’ risk communication,
and how is the target audience involved to effectively
communicate risk?

Focus on prevention

How prevention focused are national risk communication
practices?

Tapping into innovation

What is the role of innovative technologies in countries’
risk communication practices?

Evaluation

What is the effect of risk communication, and how is it
being measured?

Note. Based on OECD (2016).

the Netherlands particularly focused on the individual citizen’s ability
not only to manage but also to prepare for crises. The risk communication of Cyprus, conversely, was exclusively one way, providing expert
information for the purpose of “educating people” (Tourenq et al.,
2017, p. 547). Arguably, there exist two different assumptions on which
risk communication architecture is based: the “educate the public” approach, where citizens are seen as passive and unknowledgeable, and
the “resilient citizen” approach, where citizens are not only active and
knowledgeable but also seeking responsibility for themselves and the
community (see Aradau, 2014).
This leads us to the orientation of this article, which is a critical
perspective of risk and risk communication as constituent components
of the imaginary of emergencies (Boisseau, Feltey, Flynn, Gelfand, &
Triece, 2008; Calhoun, 2008). Risk and its communication create a
demand for changes to society and to individuals: Risk may be viewed
as a concept intent on exercising power (Wilkinson, 2009). The notion
of risk can thus serve as a control technique expressing the interaction

212

petridou, danielsson, olofsson, et al.

of power relationships (Hannah-Moffat & O’Malley, 2007). This opens
up for questions of how notions of risk come to “delimit what it is
possible to think and say at a particular time, what purpose does this
serve, and to whose benefit?” (Wardman, 2008, p. 1633), or as Calhoun
(2008, p. 381) put it, how the conceptualization of risk impacts on the
social organization of fear. In some cases, inequalities are (re)produced
by modes of governance, including the use of “risk” as a regulatory
regime that is shaped by power imbalances (Giritli Nygren, Öhman, &
Olofsson, 2017; Montelius & Giritli Nygren, 2014). Risk communication
often aims at supporting vulnerable populations, but by making the
power dimension of risk communication and its intersection with other
lines of power visible, we allow for an analysis of risk communication
practices that does not hide the reproduction of existing norms and
social inequality.
For this reason, we pay special attention to the issue of representativeness. The audience of risk communication consists of diverse publics,
necessitating a certain tailoring of the message to establish trust and
collaboration (Janoske, Liu, & Sheppard, 2012). Janoske et al. reported
on children, the elderly and disabled, and racial and ethnic minorities.
We considered risk communication aimed at transient populations as
well as people living in rural areas in our study in an effort to broaden
the diversity of publics under consideration.
In summary, there is a paucity of cross-country comparative research
examining such issues as risk communication policies, institutional actors, the intended recipient and message content, and even fewer with
a critical component. The extant international comparisons, though
they provide an important starting point for thinking about risk communication in comparative terms, do not go far enough in addressing
the imaginary of emergencies in Europe and nuances among countries under investigation. For example, Tourenq et al. (2017) mentioned factors such as “history, people, management, and lack of funds”
(pp. 546–547) but do not go any further. This article adds to the limited
knowledge of risk communication at the national and subnational
levels (Infanti et al., 2013) but also expands the analysis with a systematic
comparison among EU countries. Such comparison has a number of
practical implications. Different countries often face not only similar
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risks but also risks that stretch over national boundaries. The insight
into how countries perceive and communicate risk and prepare for
crises has the potential to facilitate coordination in the face of an
extraordinary event. A recent example of a European civil protection
mobilization took place in summer 2018 when the coordinated effort
of eight countries assisted Sweden in battling destructive forest fires
(European Commission, 2018).
Research Design, Method, and Data

This is a qualitative systematic comparison aiming at capturing as much
variation as possible among EU member states. To fulfill the objective
of maximum variation in the cases selected, the logic of comparison is a
variation of the “most different systems” logic, which is a logic of systematic cross-country comparison first articulated by Przeworski and
Teune (1970; see also Collier, 1993; Meckstroth, 1975). Rather than uncovering causal relationships, the eight-country comparison contrasted
contexts to establish a framework for understanding how risk communication processes play out in different ways in each context. This interpretive dimension in social sciences is accommodated within small N comparative studies as elaborated in Skocpol and Somers (1980). The authors
posited that asking the same or similar analytical questions in contrasting contexts may highlight divergences, making them more transparent—though this is not a causal analysis producing sweeping theory.
To that end, the selection of cases covered the entire geographic
gamut of the EU 28. Geography is relevant because it partly (though
not exclusively) determines what kind of events might be conceived as
threats by each country. Additionally, geography functions as a kind
of proxy for the historical contingences idiosyncratic to each country.
Traditionally, Greece and Cyprus belong to the European South; France
and Germany are in Western Europe (though Germany is sometimes
classified as Central) and Sweden and Finland belong to Northern
Europe, while Estonia is part of Eastern Europe. The British Isles here
are considered a part of Western Europe,1 though elsewhere they may
be classified as a region of their own (Libraries of the University of
Minnesota, 2012).
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Thematic Guide for Data Analysis
Category

Institutional actors

Constituent questions
What institutional actors are involved in the risk
communication process?
Are there any nongovernmental organizations involved,
and if so, how?

Method

How is the message communicated to the public?
Is the communication in any language other than the
official language for each country investigated? If that is the
case, is the message the same?
Are there any provisions to spread the message to
subgroups of the population, such as (a) people with
disabilities, (b) nonnative speakers (tourists or immigrants),
(c) people in elderly care, (d) the homeless.
What kinds of media (videos, pictures, text) are used to
convey the message?

Content

What kinds of risks and potential crises do the countries
under comparison take up?
Are there any campaigns (with or without a timeline)
geared toward raising public awareness when it comes to
crisis preparedness? If so, what do these campaigns look
like?

Effectiveness

Have there been any evaluations assessing the effectiveness
of the risk communication tools?

Additionally, the countries under examination covered the entire
typology range of public administration systems in Europe (Kuhlmann
& Wollmann, 2014). This is relevant because risk communication is
part of the public administration arrangements of each case in terms of
institutions involved, message conveyed, and so on. France and Greece
belong to the Continental European Napoleonic model, characterized
by a strong centralized government and a powerful centralized bureaucracy, which means that the subnational and local levels are considered
to be subordinate. In contrast, in the Continental European Federal
model (Germany), the central bureaucracy is weaker, and the subnational, decentralized institutions have more power. In the Scandinavian
model (Sweden, Finland), the administrative structure is also highly
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decentralized, while the most salient feature of the Anglo-Saxon model
(England and, to a certain extent, Cyprus) is new public management
decentralized managerial practices (Kuhlmann & Wollmann, 2014). In
Estonia, we capture the postcommunist environment with the attendant
interventionist state.
Our investigation was conducted on publicly available text and images (still and video) comprising risk communication material at the
preparedness phase. Data included information about risks, warnings,
self-protection guidelines, and other publications geared toward various
publics on outlets (official websites, YouTube channels, and Facebook
groups) authored and curated by public entities of, or related to, civil
protection or civil defense. We, the authors, have native or near-native
linguistic competence as well as country-specific knowledge of the
countries we compared. This eliminated any linguistic or cultural misunderstandings and allowed for a nuanced analysis of texts and images.
We asked the same questions of the data, thematically arranged and
summarized in Table 2. We used these questions to address the core
elements of a national risk communication system (see Table 1) and,
in turn, unpack the imaginary of emergencies.
Results

In this section, we present the results of the data analysis based on
the thematic guide presented in Table 2. The purpose of the analysis
is to understand how the imaginary of emergencies (Calhoun, 2008)
is reflected in the risk communication practices of the eight selected
countries by fleshing out any convergent as well as divergent points
among them, structured after the items in Table 1.
Governance Arrangements: Who Is in Charge of Risk
Communication?

The degree of the centralization of responsibility for risk communication varies among the countries under comparison, generally along the
lines of their administrative system. The institutional risk communication architecture in the Scandinavian countries follows the corporatist
model with civil society and the local level being important actors and

216

petridou, danielsson, olofsson, et al.

builds on collaboration among agencies and municipalities as well as
the involvement of private and volunteer sectors. The Swedish Civil
Contingencies Agency (MSB), placed under the Ministry of Justice, and
the Finnish department for Rescue Services have strategic, coordinating, and supportive responsibilities. More specifically, the Swedish MSB
provides information to the public mainly through two websites (http://
www.dinsakerket.se/ and http://www.krisinformation.se/), though the
websites of county administrative boards and municipalities also convey
information to the public. The Finnish Rescue Services are responsible
for preventing accidents, providing emergency services, and protecting
the population in exceptional circumstances at the regional level and are
also responsible for civil defense (Finnish Ministry of the Interior, 2018).
Conversely, France and Greece, in Western and Southern Europe,
respectively, follow the continental Napoleonic model, and unsurprisingly, the national government is in charge of what is communicated
and how. In France, the General Secretariat for Defense and National
Security (SGDSN) in the Ministry of the Interior coordinates the national plans that serve as decision support tools at the national level.
The secretariat supports the prime minister and the president in their
role as crisis managers and is also responsible for civil defense (Gouvernement Français, 2018a). Similarly, in Greece, civil protection issues
are handled by the General Secretariat for Civil Protection established
in 1995 and tasked with coordinating risk communication to citizens
both in general terms and during exceptional circumstances (Republic
of Greece, 2002).
The Estonian Rescue Board, the third largest public service institution in Estonia, is the main actor in risk communication (Päästeamet,
2017), whereas in England, the substance and method of delivery of
risk communication are the responsibility of Local Resilience Forums.
These are not legal entities but “collaborative mechanisms” that “have a
collective responsibility to plan, prepare and communicate in a multiagency environment” (Cabinet Office, 2013, p. 3). Most of these follow
police force boundaries (Garton Grimwood, 2017). The organization
with leading responsibilities in emergency management is the Civil
Contingencies Secretariat in the Cabinet Office, established in 2001
(Cabinet Office, 2013).
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In Germany, the institution responsible for informing the public
of risks and potential crises is the German Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz
und Katastrophenhilfe; BBK) under the German Interior Ministry
(BMI), which is the highest federal authority. The main purpose of
the BBK is to prepare the public for times of crisis; coordinate all the
bodies involved before, during, and after a crisis; and provide the
physical and psychological support necessary for citizens’ well-being
(Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe [BBK],
2018a, 2018b). Municipalities are active in civil defense (Zivilschutz- und
Katastrophenhilfegesetz, 1997/2009, para. 5/1), and they use information available on the BBK website. Additionally, a host of voluntary
organizations is actively involved in communicating information to
the public.
This is not the case in Cyprus, where for one to be a volunteer, one
must be a citizen of the Republic of Cyprus and register by submitting
an online form. Strategic policy decisions are made by the General Civil
Defense Administration, while there are also five district administrations (Cyprus Ministry of the Interior, 2018a). The Civil Defense Force
has the added responsibility to protect citizens in periods of hostilities
(Cyprus Ministry of the Interior, 2018b).
Which Hazards Are Communicated, and to What Extent Is
the Focus on Prevention?

Greece, Estonia, Cyprus, and France focus on various known risks
and hazards—such as earthquakes; inclement weather; landslides; and
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats—with
a focus on those threats specific to each country. For example, Greece
places a particular emphasis on forest fires, which occur annually and
to a certain extent are due to either human error or arson, but there is
no mention of the threat of terrorist attack or hostilities. The current
geopolitical alignment of Greece and its self-reference as an interstice
between East and West may exclude the imaginary of a space for terrorist attacks of the kind similar to those elsewhere in Europe. However,
emphasis is put on home fires as, due to the economic crisis, people
have started using braziers and burning various materials in their
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fireplaces. There is a marked focus on prevention of these well-defined
risks (General Secretariat for Civil Protection, 2018).
In Estonia in 2016, a spatial analysis of home fires showed a correlation with socioeconomic factors. In Tallinn, for example, home fires
occur more often in residential buildings from the Soviet era, where
inhabitants in general are older, have lower income, and live alone
and where Estonian is not their first language. In a departure from the
other countries under comparison in this study, the Estonian Rescue
Board conducts home visits during which they advise residents on
how to make their home safer. In 2016, the board carried out more
than 17,000 home consultations, covering 2.7% of Estonian households. It also organizes safety awareness days and regular school visits
(Päästeamet, 2017).
France covers a broader array of risks with a number of sectoral
plans (national and territorial), each corresponding to a previously
identified risk or threat. A set of complementary plans, Plan Vigipirate
(the Pirate Family), specifically addresses the capacity of the state and
relevant stakeholders to deal with terrorist attacks (Gouvernement Français, 2018b). At the national website, there is a specific section on risk
prevention (Gourvernment Français, 2018c). Under the slogan “Better
prepared, better informed, you will be able to act in case of problems
and help your loved ones in the face of an emergency,” video tutorials
address a number of risks. The Ministry of Interior Affairs’s website
contains a section about personal security (“Ma sécurité”) where citizens
can learn how to avoid accidents inside and outside the home with a
special section for the elderly (French Ministry of the Interior, 2018).
The Civil Defense Force in Cyprus takes up the same risks as Greece
with additional information on what to do in the event of hostile action (the Greek word ehthropraxía [εχθροπραξία] conveys “act of war”
rather than “terrorist attack”), including the case of a bombing campaign by another nation and fires caused by such action. The message
is unequivocal: “Self-protection is basically the responsibility of all of
us. Take the necessary measures in good time” (Civil Defense Force,
2002, n.p.).
While this quote stems from the threat of invasion in Cyprus, the
Greater Manchester Local Resilience Forum has a similar message on
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its website: “Whilst we can’t prevent emergencies happening, we can
plan ahead to minimise the impact” (Greater Manchester Prepared,
2018, n.p.), admitting that the state is unable to keep the citizenry safe
through prevention measures and that safety is the responsibility of
the individual. In addition to England, risk communication strategies
in Sweden and Germany are characterized by an all-hazards approach
that focuses on consequences and the open admission that risks cannot be prevented.
Both Sweden and Germany have incorporated preparedness campaigns in their risk communication strategies, in which the public is
urged to have a store of supplies at hand to survive a certain period of
time during which a complete disruption of societal functions is imagined, including loss of electricity, water, means of transportation, and
any other amenity that one takes for granted in an advanced Western
democracy. The German BKK’s website recommends storing enough
food and water to survive for at least 2 weeks in the worst-case scenario
(BBK, 2017, p.10), though conflicting guidelines from the Ministry of
the Interior advising 5 days’ worth of water supplies and 10 days’ worth
of food created confusion among the citizens (Bundesministerium des
Innern, für Bau und Heimat, 2016).
In Sweden, to raise public awareness, MSB ran a weeklong campaign on May 8, 2017, titled “Upside Down” (Upp och Ner). This was
the second such MSB-led campaign, and its target group was women
between 45 and 64 years of age. The campaign centered on disruption
in electricity supply and focused on the necessities each household
ought to have to be able to function during a days-long blackout. This
campaign essentially reinforced the earlier message communicated
on the websites of Swedish municipalities and county administrative
boards: “this is what you need to have at home during a crisis” (detta
behöver du ha hemma vid en kris).
In Finland, a very different 72-hour campaign mainly consisted of
meetings between nongovernmental organization (NGO) representatives and the public. The campaign was partly carried out online, but
the main focus was on face-to-face workshops. Apart from the official
72-hour website (http://www.72tuntia.fi/), which is available in Finnish, Swedish, and English, several organizations, for example, Suomen
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Pelastusalan Keskusjärjestö (the Finnish National Rescue Association; SPEK), also distributed printed information about the 72-hour
campaign. Notably, SPEK, which is a national consultancy and service
organization for fire and rescue services responsible for training NGO
workers, has used MSB YouTube videos in their training material in
the Swedish speaking areas of Finland. Whereas the 72-hour campaign
is mainly geared toward the urban population, SPEK also maintains
a project called “Our Safe Village” that is geared toward small-town
preparedness for everyday disruptions and accidents (Suomen Pelastusalan Keskusjärjestö, 2018).
Tap Into Innovation: The Use of Technology in Risk
Communication

With the exception of Cyprus, all countries use YouTube to post TV
spots and educational films. They also use Facebook and Twitter as
information dissemination tools. Sweden, England, France, and Germany have launched smartphone applications varying in scope and
interactivity. For example, the French government describes the aims
of the app (called SAIP) as follows: “It is part of an approach to develop a culture of vigilance and security of our citizens, initiated with
the awareness campaign ‘React in case of terrorist attack’ which gives
practical instructions based on: ‘escape, hide, alert’”(Gouvernement
Français, 2018d, n.p.).
Conversely, the German app NINA aims at informing the public
about current weather situations; national, regional, and local threats;
and, in particular, large-scale emergencies (Großschadenslagen). The
dissemination of local-specific information is limited due to the service
availability (BBK, 2018c).
Know Your Impact

It is unclear whether the countries under comparison know the impact
of their risk communication strategies. Though the institutional actors involved have the mandate to evaluate (e.g., Republic of Greece,
2002), no evaluations of risk communication strategies are available on
governmental websites. Estonia, however, is an exception to this: The
Estonian Rescue Board seeks public feedback to measure satisfaction
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and trust in the board’s operations. Feedback was gathered after rescue
events, home consultations, training sessions, safety days, and construction site inspections (Päästeamet, 2017).
Communicate—to Whom?

Most countries convey some information in English, though the English
version lacks in depth and detail. The “easy language” versions of the
Swedish and German websites are also limited. Where the automated
translation function of Google is used, the results can range from confusing to amusing. At the two sides of the continuum are Greece, with
information in six professionally translated languages, and Cyprus and
England, with information only in Greek and English, respectively.
The image of society that comes across by the risk communication
content and techniques is fairly traditional in terms of family structures,
households, and people. For example, images of people with obvious
disabilities are few and far between.
Generally speaking, spatial images are generic, though the environment is implicitly urban. This is deduced not by what is said but rather
by what is left unsaid. For example, there is no information specific to
the countryside. Exceptions to these are the “Safe Village” campaign
in Finland and the information from the English Local Resilience
Forums, because the latter are very localized and the information fits
the local context.
Communicate—for What Purpose, and What Is the Role of
the Recipient?

All eight EU countries, to various degrees, advise the public on how to
prepare, act, and protect themselves and others during events ranging
from inclement weather to acts of war by providing specific information
on these risks. We did not find any instances of explicitly interactive
communication. Even in countries in which there exist smartphone
apps, the information seems to be flowing one way. Having said this,
the content of information seems to activate the recipients: They are
urged to have a family contingency plan, to actively protect their homes
from fires, and to be vigilant and inform if they see suspicious objects
left unattended in public spaces.
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As mentioned elsewhere in this article, Sweden and, to a certain
extent, Germany have incorporated a specific kind of campaign in their
risk communication strategies, a campaign focused on consequences
rather than risks that urges the public to have supplies to last them
for some time in case of complete societal breakdown due to a mostly
unspecified—and largely irrelevant to the substance of the communication—risk. Sweden alone is sending this information in print form
to all the households in the country.
This focus on the consequences of an unspecified catastrophic event
has had the unforeseen effect of commodifying risk in Sweden. The
emphasis on materiality has created a marketplace for the products
that the state recommends be in every household storage space, such
as canned water.
We argue that this is a case of the citizen being nudged into a perceived resilient state by the admission of the public sector that it will be
unavailable at the onset of an unspecified extreme event. Additionally,
this is a rather static idea of resilience, as the focus is on the materiality
of preparedness rather than social relations and making sure that one’s
neighbor is safe as well. This discourse echoes the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which shifts the responsibility of
emergency management from the federal to the state, local, community,
and individual levels (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018).
Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research

The eight countries under comparison cover the gamut of geographies
and administrative systems. Moreover, two pairs of countries—Greece
and Cyprus and, to a certain extent, Finland and Sweden—share a
common language and the culture and heritage that are embedded in
language. One would expect similarities in the way the imaginary of
emergencies is reflected in the risk communication policies of Greece
and Cyprus, both part of the European South but with different administrative systems, but that is not the case. Finland runs a campaign with
the same title as Sweden’s, shares the same message, and uses material
from MSB in their information tool kit in the Swedish-speaking parts
of the country. However, the focus is on training volunteer personnel
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and not blanket information dissemination to the public. There are
also two countries that share a (post)colonial relationship—the United
Kingdom and Cyprus. While the United Kingdom and Cyprus share
the same administrative system to some extent, a vestige from an earlier
colonial relationship, Cyprus is alone in the degree of militarization
of civil defense, and the United Kingdom is the foremost country arranging its risk communication structure under the term resilience.
The factor overriding a common heritage (with Greece) or a common
administrative system (with the United Kingdom) is previous experience with an extraordinary event, and Cyprus has had a very recent
experience of military action.
The pattern of institutional structures that organizes risk communication in all the countries under investigation aligns with their
administrative systems. The institution that deals with risk communication is a variation of a civil protection entity normally under the
ministry of the interior, though in the United Kingdom, the central
institution is in the Cabinet Office. Incidentally, this is the equivalent
of the Swedish Prime Minister’s Office, where the Secretariat for Crisis
Management was placed when it was first created in Sweden in 2007
(Petridou & Sparf, 2017). Sweden and the United Kingdom use the
term civil contingencies, whereas Finland, Cyprus, and Estonia use the
term civil defense. The remaining countries use civil protection. There
is a marked military component in the Cypriot structure, but perhaps
this is unsurprising given that its capital is the only remaining divided
capital in the world. There are military echoes in Finland and Estonia
as well, which is again perhaps unsurprising given their historical
contingencies and recent geopolitical events.
The pattern of central control with decentralized input holds more or
less in all countries, including the federal Germany. The U.K. system is
very different, however, where the central level has only strategic functions and all the risk communication competencies have been devolved
to the regional level in what are called Local Resilience Forums. This
makes for a lack of uniformity in information that is communicated to
the public, as each resilience forum is region specific. At the same time,
the public receives information relevant to them and not a generic version of risk communication. In the other countries under comparison,
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information is reproduced at the subnational level from the national
website, which can make for a “one-size-fits-all” information packet
missing local nuances, such as center–periphery issues. In France,
there is a marked fragmentation of information disseminated to the
public with several ministries being involved in the process. Notably,
this fragmentation is at the national level, as the responsibility for
risk communication rests with the national government. Conversely,
in Greece, for example, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat informs
citizens of risks, including risks that are corollaries of adverse weather,
whereas in France, the Ministry of Ecological and Solidarity Transition
informs on these risks.
Volunteer organizations are present in all the countries in question,
though not to the same degree. This ranges from a controlled registration system in Cyprus to very active involvement in Finland to a separate
volunteer organization coordination entity in the United Kingdom.
Other than Germany and Finland, in which volunteer organizations
provide risk communication, in most of the countries in question,
the communication is handled by government at various levels. For
example, in Germany, crisis management rests heavily on the engagement of volunteers in local organizations such as fire brigades and
rescue services. These local organizations communicate information
about risks related to their area of responsibility (e.g., fire) and how to
become a member and participate in crisis management.
Websites are the foremost vehicle for communicating information to
the public, though in Sweden, France, England, and Germany (notably,
in the more economically developed Northern and Western Europe), the
national government also employs apps as early warning systems. The
authorities also use social media to disseminate information: Facebook,
Twitter, and YouTube, though the extent varies among the countries
under comparison. In Estonia, the public sector conducts home visits
to disseminate self-protection guidelines, a possible vestige of an era
of an omnipresent state. The range of state involvement in the amount
and scope of information communicated is quite broad, ranging from
the aforementioned home visits to rather sparse information from the
Civil Defense Force in Cyprus, where the only videos found on YouTube
were recordings of military parades.
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Notably, the strategic risk communication policy gaze of the United
Kingdom and Sweden seems to be fixed westward toward the United
States in terms of devolution and a responsibilitization of the individual,
respectively. Especially in Sweden, though the state is a salient actor in
risk communication through the dissemination of information at the
agency level, the state retreats while nudging at the resilient citizen,
urging him or her to take control of his or her own crisis management.
Finally, the comparison revealed that though there are similarities
in the way the imaginary of emergencies (Calhoun, 2008) is reflected
in risk communication policies in EU countries, there are also major
differences. With the exception of governance arrangements, which
follow each country’s administrative system, we did not find stable
patterns connecting political administrative systems and geography to
the risk communication policy of all the countries under consideration.
The study, however, allowed us to tease out and showcase factors of
risk communication policy by comparing and contrasting across eight
European contexts.
Having said this, we argue that more knowledge is needed regarding
the effects of campaigns and risk communication activities directed
toward the various publics, both in terms of these publics’ understanding, knowledge, and preparedness and in terms of possible differences
between their diverse resources to respond. Furthermore, there is a
need for better understanding of the motives behind the various approaches that different countries apply. Our European comparison shed
some light on the national-level processes, but more cross-country
comparisons within Europe and beyond are needed to position our
results in a global context. In addition to breadth, we also advocate
depth. There is a need for comparative field research and interviews
with the institutional actors and publics involved in the communication
process to understand the construction of the imaginary of emergencies in different national contexts. Finally, it would be beneficial for
researchers and policy makers alike to understand the diffusion of risk
communication policies and the national environments that ideationally influence the policy process.
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